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Abstract
Regulatory arbitrage refers to structuring activity to take advantage of gaps or
differences in regulations or laws. Examples include Facebook modifying its
terms and conditions to reduce the exposure of its user data to strict European
privacy laws, and Uber and other platform companies organizing their affairs to
categorize workers as nonemployees. This essay explores the constraints and
limits on regulatory arbitrage through the lens of the technology industry, known
for its adaptiveness and access to strategic resources. Specifically, the essay
explores social license and the bundling of laws and resources as constraining
forces on regulatory arbitrage, and the legal mismatch that can arise from new
business models and innovations as a key area in which the limits of regulatory
arbitrage can be observed.
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“Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not
apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter here.”
– Cyber-philosopher John Perry Barlow (1996)1
1. Introduction
Legal strategy or gamesmanship known as “regulatory arbitrage” has been
defined in various ways, such as “transactions designed specifically to reduce costs or
capture profit opportunities created by different regulations or laws.”2 Regulatory
arbitrage “occurs when parties take advantage of a gap between the economics of a deal
and its regulatory treatment.”3 With examples ranging from financial maneuvers such as
tax shelters and shadow banking, to strategic choices such as offshoring business or
assets, the discourse on regulatory arbitrage often revolves around how to solve it.4
As opportunity for regulatory arbitrage is created by gaps or differences in
regulations or laws, the prevailing wisdom is that regulatory arbitrage can be
counteracted by harmonization.5 But, recognizing that efforts at uniformity are
contentious and difficult, other scholars suggest alternative solutions such as coordinating
different legal regimes through conflicts-of-law rules.6 Another approach to regulatory

1

Barlow JP (1996) A declaration of the independence of cyberspace. Electronic Frontier Foundation,
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
2

Partnoy (1997), p 227. For additional discussion of the definition of regulatory arbitrage, see Part 2.1.

3

Fleischer (2010), p 227.

4

Regulatory arbitrage is generally perceived as a problem. See García (2019), p 207 (“[A]t its core,
regulatory arbitrage is distortionary behavior that can thwart regulatory intent and disadvantage actors who
play by the rules.”); Fleischer (2010), p 230 (“[A] more precise understanding of when and how
gamesmanship occurs allows us to address the problem in a targeted fashion that avoids sweeping,
overbroad reforms that do more harm than good.”).
5

See, e.g., Weadon (2012) (discussing lack of international harmonization in OTC derivatives regulation).

6

Riles (2014); see also Freeman and Rossi (2012) (discussing interagency coordination as a mechanism to
reduce regulatory arbitrage).
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arbitrage simply emphasizes the need to improve the drafting of laws and to use antiavoidance regimes.7 On the whole, a reader of the regulatory arbitrage literature is left
with the impression that the problem could be fixed or at least significantly reduced if
only we had harmonized laws, coordinated laws, or well-drafted laws.
A deeper look at the thin line between strategic legal planning and abusive
conduct reveals a great number of related concepts to regulatory arbitrage. Discussion of
these concepts reflect a similar stance of seeking solutions but also accepting some level
of inevitability, whether it is through the language of loopholes, circumvention,
avoidance, evasion, avoision, or regulatory cat-and-mouse.8 The law is riddled with
loopholes to fill and well-resourced market participants will find a way to exploit patchy
regulatory landscapes.9 Companies have the freedom to establish and structure their
activities in ways that may be socially productive or may ultimately harm the public
interest—policing this problem is both necessary and imperfect.
But what does not get much scholarly attention is a separate but related
question—why don’t we see more regulatory arbitrage? What constrains it? Regulatory
arbitrage takes advantage of gaps or differences in laws—these are in abundant supply
around the world.

7

See, e.g., Barry (2011), p 73 (“[R]egulatory arbitrage can be eliminated by crafting legal rules that
accurately track the economic substance of transactions. . . If there is no gap to take advantage of, there is
no risk of regulatory arbitrage. When seen in this light, regulatory arbitrage is a phenomenon that follows
from having regulations that fail to take economic reality into account.”).
8

See Katz (1996), p 4 (coining the term “avoision” to refer to cases in which it is unclear whether conduct
should be considered lawful avoidance or illegal evasion); Wu (2017); Burk (2016).
9

See Wu (2018) (describing the economic and political power of large technology companies); Fleischer
(2017), p 230 (“[T]he rich, sophisticated, well-advised, and politically connected avoid regulatory burdens
the rest of us comply with.”).
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We might be especially concerned about large and potentially even growing
amounts of regulatory arbitrage in the tech industry because it is highly adaptive by its
nature in the digital era. Entrepreneurship has always represented the pursuit of new and
better ways of doing things and the potential for “creative destruction.”10 And, in an era
of digital technology ranging from cryptocurrency to platforms, innovation has a global
reach that appears untethered to physical presence. Tech companies are particularly wellpositioned to create new products and services that don’t quite fit existing categorizations
and to flexibly move vast intangible wealth across jurisdictions. The tech industry is
notorious for design that pushes the regulatory envelope and aggressively uses rhetoric to
defy legal norms and shape legal classifications.11
Furthermore, some of the largest and most powerful companies in the world are in
the tech industry.12 Many of the tech behemoths have engaged in notable regulatory
arbitrage that has captured news headlines. Apple Corporation, for instance, famously
escaped tax liability by figuring out a way to put billions of profits in subsidiaries that
exploited differences in U.S. and Irish laws.13 Once Irish officials cracked down on the
tax structure, Apple moved its strategy to Jersey in the Channel Islands.14

10

Schumpeter (1942).

11

Pollman (forthcoming) (discussing tech culture and permissionless innovation); Stemler (2017)
(discussing rhetorical devices and techniques used by sharing economy companies to avoid legal rules and
obligations).
12

See Cohen (2017), p 199 (“Although such [platform] corporations are nominally headquartered in
particular countries and have physical assets in many other countries that are amenable to control in
varying degrees, their great economic power translates into correspondingly powerful capacity for
regulatory arbitrage.”).
13

Marian (2017), p 7 n 44.

14

Drucker J, Bowers S (2017) After a tax crackdown, Apple found a new shelter for its profits. NY Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-jersey.html.
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Other tech giants similarly garnered attention for their strategies. Amazon’s
controversial avoidance of sales tax for the first fifteen years of its existence gave it an 810% price advantage over local retailers.15 In advance of the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), Facebook modified its terms and conditions so that data
from 1.5 billion of its users, previously managed from its European office in Ireland to
benefit from low corporate tax rates, would instead be handled by its U.S. headquarters
which falls under less strict privacy laws.16 Google and other companies with digital
business models may soon be subject to a new tax on revenues from the European
Commission and the U.K. Treasury, which aims to rectify previous characterizations of
technology products and services such as digital advertising as lacking a physical
presence for tax purposes.17
Understanding the constraints and limits on regulatory arbitrage has become
increasingly important. This essay explores this topic through the lens of the technology
industry, known for its adaptiveness and access to strategic resources. Some applications
of regulatory arbitrage such as aggressive tax planning are generalizable to a variety of
businesses but the ability to use technology to design around regulation and to take
advantage of legal categorizations also enables different expressions of regulatory
arbitrage, which make the tech industry a particularly rich area of scholarly focus.18
15

Khan (2017), n 204.

16

Facebook to exclude billions from European
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43822184.
17

privacy

laws,

BBC

(April

19,

2018),

See Cui (2018).

18

See, e.g., Wu (2003) (discussing how code is used to avoid the law and seek legal advantage); Eler and
Henrekson (2016) (discussing “profit-driven business activity in the market aimed at circumventing the
existing institutional framework by using innovations to exploit contradictions in that framework”).
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This essay offers new insight into limits on regulatory arbitrage. It begins with a
brief look at definitions of regulatory arbitrage and related terms, as well as examples
from the tech world. Next, it examines constraints and limits on regulatory arbitrage,
starting from discussions in existing literature and then moving to new ground.
Specifically, it explores social license and the bundling of laws and resources as
constraining forces on regulatory arbitrage, and the legal mismatch that can arise from
new business models and innovations as a key area in which the limits of regulatory
arbitrage can be observed.
First, the discussion demonstrates that aggressive regulatory arbitrage can erode
social license and create a more costly environment for sustainable operation.19
Particularly when regulatory arbitrage creates social costs that are widely observed, social
opprobrium from the public can affect whether, and the extent to which, such a strategy is
a valuable course of action to pursue or continue.
Second, although a company might be able to arbitrage a particular law, the
opportunity arises not in isolation but within a system of laws and in light of other needs
and preferences such as investment capital, workforce talent, brand value, and personal
benefits for executives that may constrain the decision. The more that laws can be
discretely chosen, the greater potential for regulatory arbitrage. And conversely, the
greater the extent to which a law is bundled, the less room there may be for regulatory
arbitrage to function as a valuable strategy.

19

Social license refers to the “social approval of those affected by a certain business activity.” Melé and
Armengou (2016); see also Sale (forthcoming 2020). The concept draws upon the notion of business as a
social institution that requires legitimacy from stakeholders. For further discussion, see Part 3.1 infra.
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Third, in some instances, gaps or differences in laws exist but are part of a
regulatory environment that is generally prohibitive for certain kinds of new business
models or innovations to operate on a global scale, which gives rise to a need to change
the laws rather than simply arbitrage them. Alternative strategies may offer more
promising outcomes for new business models or innovations and highlight that the gains
from regulatory arbitrage can be limited in these circumstances.
2. Regulatory Arbitrage
2.1. Definitions
Regulatory arbitrage has been variously defined, but the term consistently
includes the notion of manipulation or strategic design of an activity to take advantage of
specific legal or regulatory treatment. For example, as noted above, in writing about
financial derivatives, Frank Partnoy defines regulatory arbitrage as: “transactions
designed specifically to reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by different
regulations or laws.”20 He connects the term to the concept of arbitrage in modern finance
generally, in which a party “may use a variety of different trading strategies in order to
achieve the same economically-equivalent position.”21
Similarly, Victor Fleischer defines regulatory arbitrage as “the manipulation of
the structure of a deal to take advantage of a gap between the economic substance of a
transaction and its regulatory treatment.”22 He provides the example of a company that

20

Partnoy (1997), p 227.

21

Ibid.; see also Riles (2014), p 69 (“[A]rbitrage is about exploiting formal differences, despite the
functional similarity of products across different markets owing to the interrelationship of markets.”).
22

Fleischer (2010), p 230.
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would minimize agency costs by incorporating in Delaware but instead decides to save
on taxes by incorporating in Bermuda.23 At core, the economic substance of the company
is the same, but it has exploited legal differences regarding taxation to its benefit.
Fleischer notes, “[s]o long as the regulatory savings outweigh the increase in transaction
costs, such planning is perfectly rational.”24 Regulatory costs are engineered, not fixed or
exogenous—and the implications of this reality are significant for wide-ranging areas of
law such as antitrust, banking, securities, and tax.25
Scholars have also identified that distinct kinds of regulatory arbitrage exist.
Jurisdictional arbitrage, as the name suggests, takes advantage of differences in laws from
different jurisdictions.26 By contrast, categorical arbitrage exploits a legal discrepancy
between the treatment of two types of activity or products that are functionally similar.27
This could occur within the same jurisdiction by structuring conduct so that it achieves
the same substantive result but falls under law A instead of law B to save on regulatory
costs. As Annelise Riles explains, arbitrage as a mode of thinking appreciates “both
similarities and differences, all at once.”28 One can take advantage of a difference in

23

Ibid. at p 231; Bruner (2016), pp 30-38 (discussing capital mobility and regulatory competition); cf.
Talley, p 1653 (arguing that “[f]ederal law’s creeping displacement of state law has consequently
‘unbundled’ domestic tax law from domestic corporate governance regulation” in the U.S.). For a
discussion of “how offshore jurisdictions enable business entities to opt out of otherwise mandatory
domestic regulatory laws,” see Moon (2019), pp 1-2.
24

Ibid.

25

Ibid. at pp 232-234; see also Burk (2016), pp 6-7 (“[Exploitation of loopholes] happens routinely, in all
areas of social activity, producing unexpected and often undesired outcomes as regulation changes behavior
in unanticipated ways.”); Wu (2003), pp 682-683 (describing code as a technological mechanism to
minimize the burden of laws).
26

Riles (2014), p 71.

27

Ibid.

28

Ibid., p 72.
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jurisdictions or legal categorization while functionally engaging in the same activity. In
her words, “What distinguishes regulatory arbitrage is simply that all relevant differences
are differences of law or regulatory practice.”29
Others would slice regulatory arbitrage in different ways than by jurisdiction and
legal categorization. Kristelia García suggests this dichotomy: “(1) ontological—i.e., the
manipulation of a statutory definition so as to either avoid regulatory scrutiny, or to
benefit from preferential statutory treatment; and (2) exploitative—i.e., the utilization of a
regulation for purposes at odds with the statute’s purported legislative intent.”30 She
illustrates the first with Pandora’s purchase of a terrestrial radio station in order to
recategorize itself from a digital radio platform to a mixed-use company and lower its
regulatory costs for public performance royalties.31 The applicable statute does not
expressly prohibit this conduct but it also doesn’t contemplate internet radio stations
doing this to manipulate their royalty rate. An example of the latter category, exploitative
arbitrage, according to García, is a content owner’s issuance of a baseless or inaccurate
takedown notice of alleged infringement—misusing the mechanism under U.S. copyright
law for purposes not envisioned, such as improperly forcing the removal of negative
reviews about a company or product.32
A host of other terminology in the literature also adds color and depth to
descriptions and reminds that technical definitions of regulatory arbitrage are perhaps of

29

Ibid.

30

García (2019), p 203; see also Burk, pp 15-16 (discussing technological and ontological avoision).

31

García (2019), p 203.

32

Ibid., pp 203, 237-238.
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less importance than the notions of circumvention and strategic legal avoidance more
generally.33 Whether an actor exploits a loophole or decides to order their affairs to avoid
a particular law is arguably in the same general class of conduct and it is a contextual
matter whether it is tolerable within the bounds of the law or poses a problem, for
example by placing social or economic activity that impacts a jurisdiction beyond its
regulatory reach.34
2.2. Examples
To inquire, as this essay does, into limits on regulatory arbitrage is not to
underestimate or diminish the very substantial amount of this activity that is occurring.
Examples in the realm of technology abound. To underscore this point, it is worth briefly
considering a few.
Some regulatory arbitrage by tech companies is in the vein of the discussion
above, such as a tax inversion in which a corporation relocates its legal domicile to a
lower-tax country, while retaining material operations in higher-tax locations. Facebook’s
changing of its terms and conditions to shift the regulatory treatment of its users for
purposes of privacy laws is a variant. But examples in technology also include
33

See Katz (2010) (discussing circumvention of law and related other phrases such as evasion, avoidance,
and loophole exploitation, as well as more context-specific examples such as tax shelters and
bootstrapping, and forum-shopping); see also Moon (2019), n 7 (“Scholars typically distinguish tax
evasion, a set of illicit activities aimed at reducing taxes, from tax avoidance, which includes various forms
of legal maneuvering.”).
34

In some instances, regulatory arbitrage or legal avoidance may result in an unexpected benefit or may
mitigate regulation driven by special interests. For example, some regulatory arbitrage “may serve as an
impetus for technological innovation, or may signal to Congress an extant imbalance in statutory treatment
of similarly situated entities, potentially resulting in societal benefit on balance.” García (2019), p 203; see
also Burk (2016), pp 3-5 (describing serendipitous technology as “perverse innovation” that is a byproduct
of regulatory avoidance such as the development of mutagenic crops to avoid strict GMO regulation);
Ayres and Kapczynski (2015), pp 1812-1827 (describing innovation to avoid or lessen the impact of a
penalty such as the development of energy-efficient cars and light bulbs).
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innovations—products or services—that are designed to exploit legal classifications or
exist in legal gray areas and rely on other forms of arbitrage such as geographical
evasion. The music jukebox of the 1920s, for example, exploited an exception to the
public performance right of copyright law regarding “coin-operated machines” that was
intended for operators of penny arcades.35
More recently, in the Wild West of the 1990s and early 2000s internet, peermusic-sharing protocols evolved in ways that demonstrated arbitrage through both design
and jurisdiction choices. Gnutella designed its file-sharing technology “on concepts of
radical decentralization” to try to avoid the legal problems that led to Napster’s demise.36
The Gnutella design facilitated copyright infringement, as Napster had with its service,
but unlike Napster it had virtually no intermediaries and the file-sharing network was
“unowned and uncontrolled.”37 Its decentralized design allowed it to avoid legal liability,
but it also had stability and performance problems that led to yet another generation of
peer music file-sharing software such as Kazaa. Like Gnutella, the new generation
avoided the centralized control that doomed Napster, but reintroduced some element of
hierarchy that allowed for performance and scale. Scandinavian entrepreneurs founded
Kazaa in the Netherlands and, after litigation there, engaged in “jurisdictional exit,”
selling the application to a company that incorporated in Vanuatu, a small island in the
South Pacific that lacked a copyright law.38 The popularity of these music-sharing

35

García (2019), p 202.

36

Wu (2003), p 731.

37

Ibid., p 732.

38

Ibid., p 736; Wu (2017), p10.
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services was eventually overtaken by the launch of sites with legal legitimacy such as
Apple iTunes.
In the twenty-first century, one of the most notable examples of regulatory
arbitrage in the tech industry involves ride-hailing company Uber and other “gig” or
“sharing” economy companies that have organized their affairs to use workers they
categorize as non-employees.39 Employee classification implicates a number of areas of
law such as labor, taxation, public accommodation, and more.40 Uber and others
characterize themselves as technology companies that connect users and service
providers, such as riders and drivers—shaping their narrative as platforms rather than as
principal providers of services through the use of employees. A platform intermediates a
transaction on demand between customers and workers, by reducing search costs,
providing information about reliability and other characteristics, and providing a digital
infrastructure for the transaction to take place such as matching and clearing payments.41
Platforms may represent a “transaction costs revolution”42 but the business model quite
critically also hinges on regulatory arbitrage—credible characterizations about legal
ambiguities in employee status that allow companies to avoid the regulatory costs of a
broad range of laws.43 Platform companies provide an important example that sets the
stage for the next part of discussion.
39

Oei (2018).

40

Ibid., pp 109, 120-121.

41

Prassl (2018), pp 19-20; Lobel (2016).

42

Lobel (2016), p 106.

43

Ibid., p 156 (“[D]efinitional defiance is central to the business model of the platform.”); Tommassetti
(2016), p 78 (“[C]laims about technological sophistication and the knowledge economy can be euphemisms
for profit seeking not through productive enterprise, but through regulatory arbitrage, speculation, and other
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3. Constraints
In any legal system there will be some circumvention, some exploitation of
differences or loopholes, and some strategic choices between jurisdictions.44 To speak in
general terms, the technology industry engages in no small amount of this conduct and
even pursues entrepreneurial opportunities in this realm, sometimes testing legal
boundaries. But we can also observe that there are some limiting forces or constraints.
Scant literature has pursued this line of inquiry.45 In the most notable work to do
so, Victor Fleischer sets out a taxonomy of five constraints on regulatory arbitrage: “(1)
legal constraints, (2) Coasean transaction costs, (3) professional constraints, (4) ethical
constraints, and (5) political constraints.”46 Fleischer explores these constraints as an
explanation for why many sophisticated deals are structured in a way that does not
optimally minimize transaction costs as theory would suggest—one of his key insights
was that deal planning involves tradeoffs when attempting to minimize both regulatory
costs and transaction costs.47 Constraints to regulatory arbitrage therefore affect a
company’s ability to reduce overall costs in its business affairs.
In Fleischer’s analysis, legal constraints refer to “antiplanning rules” in statutory
schemes such as anti-avoidance sections, “look-through” or “catch-all” provisions, and

forms of asset manipulation.”). This process is dynamic and the law responds in turn, such as by
developing new statutes and case law on the issue of employee status.
44

See Katz (2010).

45

For a classic work that considers the complexity and limits of financial arbitrage in the real world given
that it requires capital and entails risk, particularly in the agency context, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
46

Fleischer (2010), p 230.

47

Ibid., pp 231-232.
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statutory tests regarding economic substance.48 Drawing on the “frictions” concept in the
tax-planning literature, Fleischer explains that transaction costs include “the costs
associated with market transactions, including search costs, asymmetric information
between the buyer and the seller, bargaining costs, moral hazard and other instances of
strategic behavior, and monitoring or enforcement costs.”49 Professional and ethical
constraints pertain to considerations about maintaining reputational capital as a lawyer
and law firm, and abiding moral obligations when advising clients about legal but
aggressive strategies.50 Fleischer notes that in reality the question of these professional
and ethical constraints “almost seems quaint” and they may be “almost trivial” in practice
since regulatory arbitrage is commonplace.51 Finally, the last constraint in his taxonomy
is political costs, which he says “are best understood in the context of corporations’ longterm involvement in the political process.”52 Fleischer focuses primarily on the political
capital required for sophisticated deal participants to navigate getting government
approval or favorable regulatory treatment of a complex transaction such as in tax or
mergers and acquisitions.53

48

Ibid., p 252-253; see also Buell (2011) (describing good faith doctrines as serving a similar antiavoidance function); Blank and Staudt (2012), p 1645 (discussing anti-abuse standards and examining
judicial responses to “technically legal activities that may be perceived as shams”).
49

Fleischer (2010), p 258.

50

Ibid., pp 262-274.

51

Ibid., pp 252, 264; cf. Barry (2011), p 71 (noting that “professional constraints are by no means a perfect
prevention mechanism,” but they “do shift deals between different structures and [this] can affect the
degree of regulatory arbitrage”).
52

Fleischer (2010), p 273.

53

Ibid., pp 283-288 (discussing “the politics of the deal”).
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This section turns now to extending this discussion of constraints by examining
three additional categories of considerations that might be managed in decisions about
engaging in regulatory arbitrage: social license, the bundling of laws and resources, and
alternative strategies for new business models and innovations.
3.1. Social License
The public and governmental responses to Uber around the world have provided
an interesting laboratory for watching the concept of social license at work. As a case
study, Uber illustrates that social license is a related but separate force than the political
constraint that Professor Fleischer identified. Whereas politics in his taxonomy concerned
the political capital that a company cultivates and relies upon to seek a particular deal
approval or regulatory outcome, social license operates more broadly as it comes from
the public and is generated by trustworthy behavior and moral legitimacy.54
Social license, developed in the sociology and business ethics literature, refers to
the concept that business exists by virtue of permission from communities and
stakeholders.55 Businesses are social institutions, as well as economic firms, and are
subject to public accountability.56 Imported into the business law literature by Hillary
Sale, social license is understood as a necessary condition for business to exist just like a
legal license to operate.57 This concept shares roots in notions of a social contract and an

54

Sale (forthcoming 2020).

55

See, e.g., Melé and Armengou (2016); Demuijnck and Fasterling (2016); Wilburn and Wilburn (2011).

56

Sale (forthcoming 2020).

57

Sale (forthcoming 2020).
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understanding that when business fails to meet public expectations, a “loss of prestige,
public standing and popular esteem” can follow that imposes costs on the business.58
Uber lost its social license, and then like a domino, its legal license to operate in
London after a series of scandals at the company in 2017.59 This episode highlights the
potential that if a company engages in overt, aggressive regulatory arbitrage, particularly
in combination with a culture that violates other public norms, a company may be reined
in from continuing to pursue its activity.
Founded in 2009, Uber grew rapidly in cities around the world, gaining popularity
among customers who enjoyed the low prices and convenience of the smartphone app.
Uber’s customers benefited from its willingness to engage in regulatory arbitrage by
receiving low pricing relative to taxis, enabled by categorizing workers as independent
contractors rather than employees (and avoiding taxi medallion regulation). But
customers also embraced Uber, and its main competitor Lyft, for other reasons as well
such as the user-friendly interface, widespread availability even in suburban areas, and
quality of service driven by customer-rating systems.60 With this formula of gains from
58

See Berle (1959), pp 90-91, 114; see also Cheffins (2018-2019) (discussing mid-twentieth century
notions of “countervailing power” on corporations); Pollman (2019), pp 634-39 (discussing Adolf Berle’s
concept of “inchoate law” that arises when corporations fail to self-regulate within expected social norms
of responsibility).
59

See Volpicelli G (2018) Uber’s London licence has been approved – but there’s a big catch. Wired,
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uber-london-licence-tfl-verdict; Satariano A (2018) Uber regains its
license
to
operate
in
London,
a
win
for
its
new
C.E.O.
NY
Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/technology/uber-london.html.
60

Lobel (2016), p 157 (“[T]he economic and social logic of the platform, pushing down transaction costs in
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regulatory arbitrage plus a differentiated service that customers wanted, and aggressive
regulatory entrepreneurship discussed further below, the company grew to a private
valuation of $69 billion by 2016.61
By 2017, however, Uber had already been plagued by a number of scandals and
its combative approach to regulatory arbitrage was in plain view to the public, with
protests around the globe. The year started with #DeleteUber, a social media campaign to
boycott the company for continuing to operate after taxi drivers had called for a
temporary boycott at New York’s JFK Airport to protest President Trump’s travel ban to
several countries with Muslim majorities.62 Many people viewed Uber’s act of continuing
to give rides, and turning off surge pricing, as an anti-labor attempt to profit from the taxi
drivers’ strike.63 Also in early 2017, Uber drivers in India went on strike to protest falling
fare rates and decreased driver incentives from the company.64
Additionally, among other controversies, it came to light that Uber had secretly
developed a software tool it called “Greyball” to evade law enforcement agencies that
were trying to crack down on its service.65 Further, Uber was hit with a lawsuit from
61

MacMillan D (2016) Uber raises $3.5 billion from Saudi Fund, Wall Street Journal,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/uberraises-3-5-billion-from-saudi-fund-1464816529.
62

Siddiqui F (2017) Uber triggers protest for collecting fares during taxi strike against refugee ban,
Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2017/01/29/uber-triggers-protestfor-not-supporting-taxi-strike-against-refugee-ban/?utm_term=.7b5c4832b00e.
63

Ibid.

64

Ram A, Kazmin A (2017) Uber’s Indian drivers strike for fourth day over earnings squeeze, Financial
Times, https://www.ft.com/content/9653ace2-f1d9-11e6-8758-6876151821a6.
65

The Greyball tool was part of a Uber program called VTOS, short for “violation of terms of service.” It
used data collected from the Uber app and other techniques to identify riders that it viewed as using or
targeting its service improperly, such as public officials who were posing as customers to investigate or
gather evidence that Uber was operating illegally. The tool showed such riders a fake version of the app
and blocked them from booking rides. Isaac M (2017) How Uber deceives the authorities worldwide, NY
Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evade-authorities.html;

17
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393288
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393288

Google’s self-driving car unit, Waymo, regarding the alleged theft of trade secrets.66 In
addition, an Uber engineer published a blog post exposing a culture of gender
discrimination and sexual harassment at the company.67
By several months later, additional scandals had mounted regarding its processes
for vetting drivers and reporting crimes to the police, and subsequently the Transport for
London (TfL) decided not to grant Uber a new Private Hire Vehicle Operator’s License
for the city, Uber’s most valuable European market. In its decision, the TfL stated it was
not satisfied that Uber was a “fit and proper person to hold a licence.”68 The cited basis
for this decision was the Greyball tool, which “can be deployed for a variety of legitimate
purposes, though some companies within the Uber group have used it for purposes of
evading regulatory enforcement in other jurisdictions.”69 In addition, as a separate and
sufficient basis for the denial, Uber “demonstrated a lack of corporate responsibility in
relation to a number of other issues which have potential public safety implications.”70
In response, the new Uber CEO at the time, Dara Khosrowshahi, issued a “Dear
Londoners” public apology in the Evening Standard, acknowledging mistakes and stating
that the company had to change to be “long-term partners with the cities we serve” and
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2017,

“run our business with humility, integrity and passion.”71 Khosrowshahi also noted that
the company had already started “doing more to contribute to the city” such as providing
wheelchair accessible vehicles and launching a clean air initiative.72 By 2018, the
company won an appeal to regain its license after agreeing to install new executive
leadership in London, implement systems for reporting alleged crimes, share traffic data
with the city, and submit to an independent board to oversee British operations.73 During
testimony, the TfL’s director of licensing explained, “We’ve had five years of a very
difficult relationship where Uber felt it didn’t require regulation.”74 In rendering the
decision on appeal, the Westminster Magistrates’ Court granted a shorter license than
normal and stated that Uber had to prove that it “can be trusted.”75
Similarly, in other cities in which Uber won early battles, cracks in the social
license manifest as new constraints and mechanisms for accountability. For example,
although Uber triumphed over a 2015 attempt by New York’s mayor, Bill de Blasio, to
squash its growth, this was only a temporary respite. Just a few years later, in 2018, the
New York City Council succeeded in passing legislation that limits the number of rideshare vehicles in the city so there would not be further growth.76 Further, the city passed
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Times,

legislation that created a minimum wage for drivers, bumping up driver’s pay by about
23 percent on average—a move that traditional yellow-cab drivers welcomed to reduce
their competition and increase income—and effectively reducing the gain from
arbitraging the employee classification.77
In all, the Uber example suggests that when a company pushes too hard on
regulatory arbitrage and uses tools of “avoision” to evade enforcement and oversight, it
can impact social license and result in a more difficult environment for sustainable
operation. This is particularly likely when the regulatory arbitrage is of the “exploitative”
variety or is combined with other activity that transgresses norms or community values.
Because regulatory arbitrage can be commonly perceived in a negative light by the
public—as circumventing obligations to society or unfairly taking advantage of
loopholes—its propensity to trigger a loss of social license may be greater than other
forms of business decisions more generally.
The costs that result from a loss of social license are hard to calculate. Uber’s
stumbles in navigating public backlash created pressure for governance changes,
additional governmental oversight, and opened up opportunity for its competitors such as
Lyft to gain market share.78 Failing to manage the ingredients for social license such as
trust and credibility could also affect the likelihood of enforcement, litigation, and rulings
regarding regulatory arbitrage strategies. For example, the largest class action in
Australian history has recently been filed against Uber for “conspiracy to act unlawfully”
77
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by over a thousand taxi drivers from multiple Australian states, seeking $500 million, and
with the class size expected to grow to tens of thousands of plaintiffs.79 From an ex ante
decisionmaking perspective, as companies engage in risk management and cost-benefit
analysis regarding legal strategy, they should also consider the potential for social license
to operate as a constraint on the successful pursuit of regulatory arbitrage.
We might also observe that for social license to function in this way, a certain
amount of openness or transparency must exist such that the public sees the regulatory
arbitrage and reacts. If a particular instance of regulatory arbitrage is viewed as an
appropriate response to overly burdensome regulation, or is carried out by a company that
offers a product or service that is embraced by consumers, regulatory arbitrage may incur
little or no public pushback and may even receive support. By contrast, if regulatory
arbitrage creates significant social costs that are apparent to the public, social opprobrium
can kick in and stop the activity or make it more costly to engage in the arbitrage. This
result may not always follow or provide a timely and effective constraint, but in
situations when the public does have information and the will to push back against
corporate activity, this response can trigger a range of costs in the form of new
governance obligations and regulations, loss of customers, and the like. Given the
importance of information for social license to operate as a constraint, the government
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and media have a role to play in bringing attention to egregious and socially harmful
instances of regulatory arbitrage.80
Furthermore, research on corporate reputation may hold insights for how social
license functions as a constraint on regulatory arbitrage. Corporate reputation research
suggests that when a firm harms its customers, the firm will suffer a loss of market
reputation and internalize this cost.81 As both social license and corporate reputation are
similarly based on notions of trustworthy behavior and moral legitimacy, this dynamic of
harm to customers may similarly help predict when regulatory arbitrage will incur a loss
of social license. For example, when a company engages in regulatory arbitrage that cuts
corners in compliance and results in harm to customer or user safety, we might expect the
company to pay a price in terms of social license, particularly if the company is
consumer-facing rather than business-to-business. In addition, corporate reputation
research suggests that harm to third parties might not result in the same loss to market
reputation as does harm to customers, but when media brings attention to the issue it
could nonetheless impact a company’s political reputation which could in turn increase
the likelihood of government investigation or enforcement action.82
Finally, the strength of social license as a constraint may vary by company,
industry, community, and across different time periods.83 Social license may also take on
80
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greater importance when other institutions, such as court systems and regulatory
agencies, are overburdened, hobbled by outdated legal frameworks, or in a state of flux.84
There are signs that the pendulum may be swinging toward a stronger awareness of the
importance of social license in current times. For example, in 2019, Larry Fink, the
founder and chief executive of BlackRock, the world’s largest institutional investor with
more than $6 trillion under management, wrote an open letter to CEOs reminding them of
the historical “social compact” that has existed in many companies between stakeholders
and corporations, and encouraged companies to embrace a greater responsibility.85 In his
previous annual letter, he had similarly highlighted the changing social and political
environment: “Society is demanding that companies, both public and private, serve a
social purpose. To prosper over time, every company must not only deliver financial
performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to society.”86 If a
company fails in this regard, “[i]t will ultimately lose the license to operate from key
stakeholders.”87
The stronger awareness of social license not only applies to the general business
environment, as Larry Fink’s letters suggest, but is particularly acute in recent times with
respect to the tech industry. The rise of “big tech,” and in particular the size, market
dominance, and potential social dangers of Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, and Facebook,
84
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have provoked a public backlash and global conversation about how to rein in the power
of these companies.88 In this environment, a loss of social license from regulatory
arbitrage could be triggered more quickly or have potentially larger magnitude in terms
of costs. For some companies such as Facebook, user trust is essential to its economic
and political power, and the loss of trust or social legitimacy poses an existential threat to
its business model.89 Given the specter of additional regulation already looming,
companies in this business environment might view social license as a more salient
constraint on aggressive maneuvering around the law.
3.2. Bundling of Laws and Resources
A second constraint to regulatory arbitrage that deserves greater examination
concerns the way in which opportunities arise in legal systems and with other interests at
stake.90 We can explore this point by looking at where technology companies choose to
locate headquarters and important centers of development.
In recent times, regulatory competition has heated up as jurisdictions fight to
become centers of technology development in an era in which economic growth is fueled
by innovation. Just a few years ago, venture capitalist Marc Andreessen advocated for
this competitive approach through deregulatory programs: “Think of it as a sort of ‘global
arbitrage’ around permissionless innovation — the freedom to create new technologies
88
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without having to ask the powers that be for their blessing.”91 In his vision, there would
be a Bitcoin Valley, where a jurisdiction had fully legalized cryptocurrency for all
purposes, and a Drone Valley, that removed all legal obstacles to unmanned aerial
vehicles, and so on by technology. Since that time, innovation clusters or hubs have
emerged and while they are permissive, they are not entirely permissionless. Andreessen
correctly observed that the relaxation of rules and the creation of innovation-friendly
programs was starting to transform certain cities and diffuse technology development.
The rollout of Google Fiber in the past decade provides a useful illustration of the
competitive dynamic. In 2009, the U.S. Congress charged the Federal Communications
Commission with developing a National Broadband Plan to expand high-speed internet
service, but it relied significantly on private investment.92 Google recognized the
importance of advancing the fiber-based infrastructure to enable other technology such as
autonomous vehicles, smart grids, advanced health technology and more.93 When Google
announced it would build a small number of experimental infrastructure projects for
broadband, fiber-based high-speed internet, it expected 10 to 50 proposals and instead
received 1,100 proposals from cities competing for the technology.94 This represented a
reversal from the traditional model in which telecommunications companies competed to
91
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get permission to operate in a particular city—instead it was cities that competed to get
Google Fiber and they showed up in huge numbers.95 The cities most attractive to Google
offered administrative efficiency to reduce costs, time, and political frictions that would
slow installation.96 Once Google demonstrated that an environment existed of cities
willing to work with private industry players, incumbents such as AT&T, Comcast, and
Time Warner subsequently prioritized deployments of broadband internet as well.97
Other examples highlight the clustering of technology development occurring in
jurisdictions that have styled themselves through permissive regulation as hubs for
drones, fintech, and autonomous vehicles. For instance, in 2013, Amazon revealed plans
for a new drone-delivery service called Amazon Prime Air, and subsequently moved its
drone research and development from the U.S. to the Canadian border and the U.K.
Around this time, the relevant U.S. regulatory body, the Federal Aviation Administration,
had restrictive rules on unmanned aerial activity and long waits for permits to engage in
drone testing.98 It was not until 2018, after a rebuke from the National Academies of
Sciences for holding back progress, that Congress ordered the FAA to take a more
permissive “risk-based approach” to regulating drones, but by then other jurisdictions had
the first-mover advantage and had attracted key innovators.99
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Similarly, in 2016, the U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority pioneered a
“regulatory sandbox” that allows fintech startups to conduct a limited test of their
products with reduced regulatory constraints and risk of enforcement action.100 Australia,
Canada, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and others have followed suit
in adopting their own versions.101 The early moving jurisdictions have attracted a
significant amount of fintech activity. Likewise with respect to autonomous vehicles,
certain jurisdictions—the U.S., Germany, the U.K., and the Netherlands—were pioneers
for licensing that enables testing and have become hotbeds for technology development.
Even within jurisdictions, competitive federalism thrives—for example, Arizona and
California became the first two U.S. states to allow autonomous vehicles to operate on
public roads without drivers and have attracted the lion’s share of companies developing
this technology.102
Decisions do not only reflect unfettered arbitrage and competition, however.
Although in isolation a particular law might be efficiently arbitraged, in the fuller picture
these laws arise in systems and with individuals who have personal benefits and
preferences as well. How else might one explain the decision of technology companies to
launch, establish headquarters, and expand in some of the most expensive regions in the
world such as the San Francisco Bay Area, New York, and Seattle?
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A variety of factors are at play and can be thought of as constraints for certain
decisions about arbitrage. The availability of talented human capital in a region is often a
critical factor. Investors may be more likely to place bets on technology companies that
are being founded nearby their own offices and in areas known for launching success
stories. Company brand and status can also be linked to locations—just think of Apple’s
slogan “designed in California” and its 2.8-million-square-foot futuristic mothership
campus built in Cupertino based on Steve Jobs’ “idealized California.”103
Further, even with regard to laws, the constraints on arbitrage are not simply
about anti-avoidance regimes—strategic decisions arise within legal systems that have
other kinds of tradeoffs.104 As we have seen, Facebook backed off its regulatory arbitrage
for tax advantages because of emergent privacy restrictions. Despite a high tax rate and
cost of operations, innovation has flourished in California with its particular mix of laws,
including labor law that encourages “knowledge spillovers” and facilitates employee
mobility—and falls under U.S. law with relatively strong intellectual property
protection.105 Bundling can act as a constraint on regulatory arbitrage to the extent a law
is non-separable from another law or regulatory regime that offers value.
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Extensive literature documents the benefits of the mix of these various factors—
“agglomeration” economics—and how challenging it is to manufacture these
ecosystems.106 Some locations are difficult to arbitrage because functional substitutes do
not exist or alternatives are simply not quite the same.
A related point is that private benefits can also be at stake in these location
decisions, particularly when there is physical presence involved. Founders and corporate
executives are likely not indifferent regarding the decision to spend significant time in
thriving, metropolitan cities with world-class amenities versus other locations that may
have cost efficiencies.107 Location choices implicate the vision that founders and
executives may have for not only the company’s brand, but also for their own lifestyles,
“personal brands,” status, and values.108 Salesforce CEO-founder Marc Benioff built the
“Salesforce Tower,” dramatically altering the San Francisco skyline, and invested heavily
in the community, including by giving millions of dollars and his personal support to an
initiative to raise taxes on corporations in the city to fund homeless programs.109 He
remarked: “San Francisco is amazing. We have these incredible companies and
106
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entrepreneurs, innovation and technology, . . . and we are responsible for the city that we
are living in and growing our businesses in.”110 The media has frequently featured his
philanthropic efforts and speculated about whether the tech billionaire might have
personal ambitions in politics.111
The Amazon second headquarters competition also provides an interesting
illustration of these points. The company created a tournament for its attention,
announcing a nationwide search and seemingly stoking regulatory competition for its
“business” of bringing jobs to a community.112 Out of many cities offering lucrative
deals, the company chose to develop new headquarters in the Washington DC and New
York metro areas—two of the most expensive U.S. cities. Yet these cities offer bundled
resources—“agglomeration” benefits including large talent pools, big-city lifestyles and
branding, as well as the potential to build political capital.113 Amazon’s founder-CEO,
Jeff Bezos, purchased a notable mansion in DC’s well-heeled and politically-connected
Kalorama neighborhood, minutes from the new Amazon site as well as the politicians and
lobbyists around Capitol Hill. In a surprising twist, Amazon quickly dropped its plans for
the New York-area site after public outcry stemming from “residents’ fears of economic
insecurity and displacement” that might result if the tech behemoth developed a corporate
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outpost in the community114—illustrating that both social license and bundling issues
were at play in the decision. And, even beyond Amazon’s second-headquarters saga,
recent reporting has highlighted that the company has not been able to fully exert
leverage in choosing locations for development efforts because the company cannot get
around the fact that it needs certain locations in and near major cities in order to do
deliveries.115 These examples demonstrate that while tech companies might use tax
inversions and havens for some assets, especially if not subject to public transparency and
pushback, they will not fully exit jurisdictions that have a gravitational pull for other
reasons.
3.3. Alternative Strategies for New Business Models and Innovations
Finally, a third constraining force on regulatory arbitrage is the presence of
alternative strategies for interacting with and responding to the law. Regulatory arbitrage
can be broadly understood as one type of business decision or approach to the law,
whether it is designing a particular transaction to take advantage of a loophole or
selecting a location for economic activity based on a favorable legal regime. Some laws
have differences or gaps that provide entrepreneurial opportunities and make regulatory
arbitrage an attractive strategy, but others present obstacles that limit the ability of a
company to lawfully operate or grow. In particular, when a fundamental mismatch exists
between new business models or innovations and laws, regulatory arbitrage may get a
114
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company only so far toward its desired outcome. In these circumstances, an alternative
strategy might hold more promise, and this option could affect the degree to which a
company might attempt to arbitrage the law.
For example, Uber chose to “arbitrage” employee classification but to
“entrepreneur” transportation laws. That is, Uber had at least a credible claim regarding
employment classification law such that it could strategically design a relationship that
arguably fit in the independent contractor status category and functionally achieved what
the company needed from drivers.116 By contrast, taxi and transportation laws were
different all over the world, but they were still generally prohibitive for Uber’s ride
sharing business model when the company was in its early years. Although there may
have been some jurisdictions that would have allowed the company to operate
immediately and without protest, the company wanted to grow globally. The size and
reach of the network of drivers and users impacted the company’s value, and the ability
to scale its business was important for raising funds from venture capital investors.117
Engaging in regulatory arbitrage by selecting only the jurisdictions that provided
favorable legal treatment or legal gaps that could be exploited would only get the
company a limited way toward its business goals.
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With some business models and innovations, or some strategies for growth, it is
infeasible to pretend that law can be ignored, avoided, or elided altogether—it must be
changed. Professor Jordan Barry and I have referred to this activity as “regulatory
entrepreneurship”—where companies “pursu[e] a line of business in which changing the
law is a significant part of the business plan.”118 Recent examples include Uber, Lyft,
Tesla, Airbnb, among others.119 Regulatory entrepreneurship in some ways could be seen
as a close relative to regulatory arbitrage—both involve strategic maneuvering in light of
laws. But in other ways, regulatory arbitrage and entrepreneurship represent contrasting
strategies that can act to constrain each other. With regulatory entrepreneurship, instead
of trying to move around the law, exit, or recategorize, the actor is trying to change the
law. The entrepreneur might use evasion and political techniques to do so,120 but these
efforts are aimed at ultimately trying to shape or change the law, not work around the law
as it stands. When circumventing the law or re-categorizing would not be sufficient or
plausible at scale for certain business models or other innovations, regulatory
entrepreneurship becomes a more appealing strategy.
To take another example, electric scooter rental companies such as Bird launched
in multiple cities despite facing a patchwork of different laws, some silent regarding
permissibility or even prohibitive. Electric scooters have the potential to solve the “last
mile” problem for public transportation, taking cars off the road and thereby easing traffic
118
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congestion and lowering pollution. But as the scooters are dockless and tracked by GPS,
users can park them anywhere at the end of their ride, which can create a nuisance
littering sidewalks. Further, scooter riders create safety hazards for pedestrians and cars
when they inevitably fail to stay in prescribed bike lanes. Like other regulatory
entrepreneurs, when Bird launched, it received cease and desist letters and then began
building popular support with users and working with local regulators to make a more
hospitable regulatory environment.121 After being pulled from the streets in some cities,
Bird has often leveraged support from users and lobbied to come back and play by new
rules that city officials are pressured into rolling out.122 When companies cannot simply
engage in regulatory arbitrage to their advantage such as by moving technology
development to an innovation cluster with permissive laws, they may instead use these
strategies of regulatory entrepreneurship to introduce innovative technology.123
The success of companies engaged in regulatory entrepreneurship depends on a
variety of legal and business factors.124 For example, a company might engage in a
sophisticated strategy of sequencing wins in locations that can build leverage for taking
on intransigent regulators in other important markets. To the extent that the laws targeted
are local or state rather than federal, this strategy may be more likely to lead to a
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favorable outcome.125 Similarly, companies that can mobilize their users for political
support are also at an advantage, particularly when dealing with regulators and legislators
that can be held accountable by the ballot box.126 Thus, while platform companies like
Uber and Airbnb are constrained in their ability to arbitrage the transportation and shortterm rental laws at the heart of their business models, they are well-positioned to try to
challenge those laws by using their platform to rally their user base to exert political
pressure, in combination with other forms of politicking.
Conclusion
Regulatory arbitrage can be understood in a neutral or negative light—either as
simply a subcategory of business decisionmaking or as harmful maneuvering that can
distort regulatory competition, shift costs, and undermine the rule of law.127 Viewed from
either perspective, understanding the constraints, boundaries, and limits of regulatory
arbitrage is a worthy aim to the extent it can shed light on the dynamic relationship
between business and law, and more specifically as it holds potential for policy makers
interested in reducing activity that can sometimes harm social welfare.
This essay has explored extensions to the existing literature on constraints to
regulatory arbitrage, including social license and the bundling of laws and resources.
Further, it has examined how companies that have legally disruptive business models or
innovations may find regulatory arbitrage of limited value in comparison to other
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strategies focused on shaping the legal environment. The above discussion of these three
points—social license, bundling, and regulatory entrepreneurship—suggest that a
complex set of factors and forces are at play in decisions about regulatory arbitrage,
ranging from transparency of information to the public to the ability of a company to
mobilize its users in support of legal change.
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